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AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
DILEMMA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
INTERACTION OF ANTITRUST LAWS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION
SANDRA FERSON YOUNG*

"The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not
be turned upon when he wins."'

I. INTRODUCTION

Businesses exist to make money. The current legal system of
subjecting international companies to multiple and conflicting
antitrust regulations imposes unnecessary costs that can obstruct
and prevent mergers.!
This multi-jurisdictional approval
requirement may impose transaction costs, such as legal fees and
several different sets of concessions, which make a marginally
possible merger no longer attractive.3 In addition, a pre-existing
. John Marshall Law School, J.D. Candidate, June
2003. Northern Illinois
University, summa cum laude, Bachelor of Science in Marketing, Bachelor of
Arts in Psychology, December 1998. I would like to thank Professor Diane S.
Kaplan and Anne Ryan for assistance in editing this article. I would also like
to thank my husband and parents for all of their encouragement and support.
1. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir.
1945).
2. See Jaret Seiberg, Global Antitrust Enforcement?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 6,
2000, at B1 (noting that when America Online purchased Time Warner, Inc.,
there were sixty different pre-merger notifications given that required the
companies to consider more than ninety countries' antitrust laws). See also
Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, A Tale of Two Regulators, N.Y. L.J., July 17,
2001, at 3 (stating that when General Electric Co. agreed to acquire Honeywell
International, Inc., the companies filed over 100 notifications with national
and regional competition authorities).
3. See generally Kathleen Luz, Note, The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas
Merger: Competition Law, Parochialism, and the Need for a Globalized
Antitrust System, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 155, 155 (1999)
(providing a thorough description of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger
and the negotiations leading to its approval). The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas
merger is another example of large companies needing merger approval from
several jurisdictions. Id. at 155. The U.S. had approved the merger but the
European Commission initially decided to reject it and impose fines on the
companies if they continued. Id. After Boeing made several concessions, the
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company facing antitrust issues in one jurisdiction will have to
defend in another jurisdiction if both jurisdictions are
investigating the same issue.4 Defending on both sides of the
Atlantic creates inefficiencies, in both time and money, that
cannot be justified. The legal system needs to address this
business problem faced by many global companies.
This comment compares the United States' (U.S.) and the
European Union's (E.U.) systems of antitrust regulation using the
failed General Electric (G.E.)-Honeywell merger as an example.
Part I-A presents an overview of the G.E.-Honeywell merger. Part
I-B examines U.S. antitrust laws and regulations. Part I-C
explores E.U. competition law.6 Part II delves into how the U.S.
and E.U. laws interact. Part I-A surveys U.S. decisions on
extraterritorial application of antitrust law. Part II-B reviews
E.U. decisions on the same issue.
Part II-C explains the
agreements that the U.S. and E.U. have entered into concerning
antitrust law. Finally, Part III proposes the creation of a single
global forum where all companies operating on an international
basis can present and resolve their antitrust issues , thereby
correcting the many inefficiencies of the present multijurisdictional approval system.
A. A Case Study: The General Electric-Honeywell Merger
The G.E.-Honeywell case is a recent illustration of the
problems international companies face because they are subject to
the multiple and conflicting antitrust laws of many nations. On
October 23, 2000, G.E.'s Chief Executive Officer, Jack Welch,7
European Commission finally approved the merger. Id.
4. See Laura E. Keegan, Comment, The 1991 U.S.IEC Competition
Agreement: A Glimpse of the Future Through the United States v. Microsoft
Corp. Window, 2 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 149, 167-68 (1996) (providing a detailed
analysis of Microsoft antitrust cases in both the U.S. and the E.U.). Microsoft
is one such company that has had to contend with multiple regulatory
agencies examining the company's antitrust activities. Id. at 168. The U.S.
Department of Justice was investigating anti-competitive practices while the
European Commission was also investigating a complaint. Id.
5. Basically, two major treaties account for the creation of the E.U.; the
1957 Treaty of Rome and the Single European Act of 1986. Carolita L.
Oliveros, InternationalDistributionIssues: Overview of Relevant International
Trade Laws, COURSE NUMBER SD62 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study Materials,
1999).
The Treaty of Rome was renamed the Treaty Establishing the
European Community [hereinafter "E.E.C. Treaty"] in 1993. Id. The Single
European Act of 1986 became effective in July of 1987 and is a set of
amendments to the Treaty of Rome. Id.
6. The E.U. refers to their antitrust law as competition law. John P.'
Flaherty & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The European Union: Where Is It Now?,
34 DUQ. L. REV. 923, 938 (1996).
7. Jack Welch was the chief executive officer (CEO) of G.E. at the time the
acquisition was announced. The Honey Monster, THE LAW, July 23, 2001, at
24. He had obtained celebrity status as a CEO and had even been referred to
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announced his company's acquisition of Honeywell International.8
Honeywell International was formed when Honeywell, Inc. merged
with Allied Signal.9
The all-stock deal was valued at
approximately $45 billion."° Just days before the G.E.-Honeywell
merger was announced, Honeywell had considered merging with
United Technologies in a deal valued at $40.3 billion." However,
once G.E. entered into negotiations with Honeywell, United
Technologies withdrew their offer because they did not want to be
part of a bidding war. 2 Analysts believed G.E. and Honeywell
were a good fit, both for their product mix and corporate cultures. 3
At the time the acquisition was announced, Jack Welch did not
foresee any problems obtaining regulatory approval. 4 In addition
to getting approval from the Department of Justice in the U.S., the
merger was subject to review and approval by the European

as "iconic." Id. As part of the deal with Honeywell, Jack Welch agreed to
delay his planned April 2001 retirement and remain as CEO until the end of
2001. Claudia H. Deutsch, Within G.E.'s Vocabulary, The Honeywell Deal
Scans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2000, at C4. Jack Welch is a "great leader" and
has a "legacy as corporate America's most-admired manager". Andrew R.
Sorkin, Failure to Acquire Honeywell is Sour Finish for G.E. Chief, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 2001, at Al. Jack Welch was the youngest CEO ever at G.E.
when in 1981 he became CEO at age forty-four. Id. He focused on areas
where the company could be number one or two in the market and for those
areas that could not, he would either fix them, sell them, or close them. Id.
8. Andrew R. Sorkin & Claudia H. Deutsch, General Electric Buying
Honeywell in $45 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at Al. Honeywell
was to become a wholly owned subsidiary of G.E., with G.E. having sole
control of Honeywell.
Commission Decision of 03/07/2001 Declaring a
Concentration to be Incompatible with the Common Market and the EEA
Agreement. Case No COMP/M.2220 - General Electric/Honeywell para. 5
(official publication forthcoming) (on file with author).
9. Sorkin & Deutsch, supra note 8, at Al.
10. Id. All references to dollars refers to U.S. dollars.
11. Andrew R. Sorkin & Claudia H. Deutsch, Offer from G.E. Breaks Up
$40 Billion Deal for Honeywell, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at Cl. See also
Sorkin & Deutsch, supra note 8, at Al (reporting that Jack Welch put this deal
together after the Honeywell board had already began a meeting about the
United Technologies offer). Jack Welch interrupted that meeting at 11:00 a.m.
Friday, and by Sunday afternoon the deal between G.E. and Honeywell had
been signed. Id.
12. Sorkin & Deutsch, supra note 11, at Cl.
13. Id.
Both companies produce plastics, chemicals, power generation
systems, and regional aircraft engines. Id. G.E. manufactures wide-bodied
jets and other commercial aircraft, whereas Honeywell focuses on avionics and
business jet engines. Id. Furthermore, Lawrence Bossidy, a former G.E.
employee, had run Allied Signal and instituted programs also used by G.E.,
such as Six Sigma, after Allied Signal and Honeywell merged. Id.
14. See Michael Elliott et al., How Jack Fell Down; Inside the Collapse of
the G.E.-Honeywell Deal - And What it Portends for Future Mergers, TIME,
July 16, 2001, at 40 (quoting Jack Welch as saying, "[t]his is the cleanest deal
you'll ever see.").
While both G.E. and Honeywell are diversified
conglomerates, their product lines shared few overlaps. Id.
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Commission (E.C. or the Commission).15 The merger was approved
by the U.S. Department of Justice on May 2, 2001, after the
companies agreed to divest Honeywell's helicopter engine business
and authorize a third-party service provider to maintain, repair,
and overhaul certain Honeywell model aircraft."
It did not take long for problems to arise on the European
front. 17 By February 2001, the E.C. decided to conduct an
extended investigation into the merger."
The E.C. expressed
concerns about bundling," but said it was not
concerned about
15. See id. (stating that the E.C. has to approve all mergers in which the
participating firms have combined revenues of $4.2 billion, with at least $212
million generated from Europe; since G.E. alone employed 85,000 people in
Europe with its year 2000 revenues from Europe totaling $25 billion, E.C.
approval was required).
Flaherty & Lally-Green, supra note 6, at 934
(describing the institutional framework of the E.U.). The institutions that
make up the E.U. are: (1) a Council of Ministers; (2) a Commission; (3) a
Parliament; and (4) the Court of Justice. Id. The Council of Ministers is the
legislative arm, consisting of a president and ministers from each Member
State. Id. at 935. The Commission's responsibilities include making policy
recommendations to the Council of Ministers and ensuring compliance with
the E.E.C. Treaty and Council policies by the member states. Id. The
commissioners, while appointed by their own country to the commission, are
not to act with bias toward any particular country, but must act with E.U.
common interests in mind. Id. The European Parliament recommends
legislation to the Council. Id. Finally, the Court of Justice, with a role similar
to that of the U.S. Supreme Court, is made up of one judge from each member
state. Id. The Justices are similarly required to act independently from their
country's interest and focus instead on E.U. interests. Id. at 935-36. The E.C.
did not receive notification of the G.E.-Honeywell deal until February 5, 2001.
Commission Decision, supra note 8, para. 1.
16. Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Requires
Divestitures in Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001)
(on file with author). The reason for these divestitures was to protect the U.S.
military from higher prices for helicopters, as well as to protect commercial
business aircraft users from increased prices repairs and maintenance of their
aircraft. Id.
17. Andrew R. Sorkin, U.S. Businesses Turn to Europe to Bar Mergers, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2001, at Al (acknowledging that acquiring approval in
Europe is a very different process than gaining approval in the U.S.). The
E.C.'s antitrust branch can block deals without going to court and a company's
only recourse is an appeal to the European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) in
Luxembourg. Id. Some consider the E.C.J. to be "an ally of the commission."
Id.
18. Paul Meller & Claudia H. Deutsch, Europe Sets Examination of G.E.
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at W1. The inquiry was extended because
some competitors expressed concerns about the proposed deal. Id.
19. See Paul Meller, Europe Plans Full Inquiry on G.E.- Honeywell Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2001, at W1 (defining bundling as a company tying
together its products into a package, thus making it more difficult for the
purchasers to compare prices on the individual products). There are four
elements to tie-in agreements that violate antitrust law:
(1) two distinct and separate products, the sale of one of which (the tied
product) is tied to the sale of the other (the tying product); (2) a refusal
by the seller to sell the tying product separate from the tied product; (3)
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portfolio effects.2 ' Additionally, the E.C. had received letters from
potential G.E.-Honeywell competitors expressing concern.2 To
ameliorate these concerns, Jack Welch agreed that G.E. would not
bundle its aircraft engines and avionics packages in situations
where the competition could not do the same.2 2
Rivals played a significant role in G.E.'s hearing before the
E.C. 2 Competitors were permitted to voice their concerns during a
hearing held in May 2001, thereby giving their opinions significant
weight.24
However, only one potential customer, Lufthansa
25
Airlines of Germany, exercised its right to attend the hearing.
Another example of the competitors significant influence was after
G.E. commenced its negotiations with the E.C., the E.C. conducted
a market test by sending a summary of concessions made to G.E.'s
rivals eliciting comments.26
The E.C. expressed several concerns regarding the G.E.Honeywell merger. For example, the E.C. was concerned that G.E.
Capital Aviation Services (GECAS), 27 a lessor of aircrafts that
the seller's possession of sufficient economic power with respect to the
tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for
the tied product; and (4) a not insubstantial amount of interstate
commerce in the tied product affected by the tying arrangement.
Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, What Constitutes "Sufficient Economic Power"
to Make Tying Arrangement Unlawful Restraint of Trade Violative of § 1 of
Sherman Act (15 USCS § 1) - Supreme Court Cases, 51 L. ED. 2D 826, 830
(1978).
20. See Meller, supra note 19, at W1 (opining that portfolio effects refer to
extending the range of products of the merged company).
21. Id.
The letters were informal responses from aircraft builders,
component makers, airlines, leasing companies and maintenance contractors.
Id.
22. G.E. Chief Says He Is Surprised by Scrutiny of a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 2001, at C4.
23. Paul Meller, G.E. Defends Deal to European Panel, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,
2001, at W1. For the E.C., competitors' opinions are given substantial time
and great weight in the merger approval process. Stoll & Goldfein, supra note
2, at 3. U.S. regulators tend to heed more to customers' opinions. Id.
24. Meller, supra note 23, at W1.
25. Id.
One attorney suggested that the airlines might refrain from
expressing their concerns about the merger because of the possibility of
injuring a relationship with a major supplier after approval of the deal. Id.
26. Paul Meller & Andrew R. Sorkin, G.E. Chief Courts Europeans on
Acquisitions of Honeywell, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2001, at C1.
27. See Elliott et al., supra note 14, at 40 (noting that, according to Jack
Welch, GECAS had only an eight percent market share in the new-plane
market).
Typically, thirty to thirty-five percent of the market share is
required before weight is given to vertical considerations. Stoll & Goldfein,
supra note 2, at 3. The E.C. stated that while GECAS purchased less than
ten percent of the aircraft, it exerted great influence over the engine market.
Commission Decision, supra note 8, at para. 125. Of particular concern was
GECAS' ability to influence smaller airlines' future purchases. Id. After the
smaller airline's initial use of G.E. equipment, fleet commonality
considerations may require the airlines to continue using G.E. equipment. Id.
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bought only G.E. engines, would buy only Honeywell avionics
systems after G.E. acquired Honeywell."
As the deadline for
submitting concessions approached,29 Jack Welch offered to divest
G.E. of $3 billion in annual revenues, operate GECAS as a semiindependent company so that parts could be bought from rivals
based on merit, and separate GECAS' accounting from G.E.
Capital. °
By mid-June 2001, approval looked bleak after the E.C. said
these final concessions would not be sufficient.31 Political pressure
began to mount when U.S. President George W. Bush expressed
his concern about the merger's potential failure. 3'
A G.E.
memoranda at that time directed employees not to focus on the
integration effort, but rather on current business needs. 33
In the meantime, the stock prices of both companies had
fallen, making the deal worth $42 billion, $3 billion less than when
Mr. Welch initially announced the deal.3 For the next couple of
weeks the E.C. worked on a draft decision rejecting the deal. The
member-nations endorsed the decision; however, Greece was not
represented and three E.U. countries did not support the
decision.
G.E. continued its lobbying efforts and stood by its
Commonality also greatly affects larger airlines' decisions on future purchases
because of concerns of maintenance costs, training the engineers, etc. Id. at
para. 153. Furthermore, GECAS is the single largest purchaser of new
aircraft. Id. para. 128. No individual airline places more than 5% of the
aircraft orders annually. Id. at para. 226. The E.C. was concerned about
G.E.'s ability to not only sell engines, but also solely provide maintenance and
financing. Id. at para. 167.
28. Paul Meller, In Europe, Aircraft Unit Hampers G.E. Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 2001, at W1.
29. See Meller & Sorkin, supra note 26, at C1 (acknowledging that the
"deadline" was not solid and negotiations were expected to continue beyond its
expiration date).
30. Id.
31. Paul Meller & Andrew R. Sorkin, G.E. Purchase of Honeywell Now
Appears Near Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2001, at C1.
32. Paul Meller & Claudia H. Deutsch, Europe Opens Door for G.E., Just
Slightly, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2001, at C1. President Bush expressed concern
about its potential failure at a news conference. Id. Jack Welch also spoke
with the White House chief of staff, Andrew Card, in hopes that Washington
could help the deal get through the process. Laurence Zuckerman & Andrew
R. Sorkin, G.E. Calls Its $45 Billion Bid for Honeywell All but Dead, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2001, at A31. It is also interesting to note the interplay
between G.E. and Honeywell during this process. G.E. could not withdraw its
offer unless Honeywell gave explicit permission, which Honeywell had not
given. Id. Furthermore, G.E. was legally obligated under the merger
agreement to use its "best efforts" in pursuing approval of the deal. Andrew R.
Sorkin, G.E.-Honeywell Deal: If at First.. ., N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2001, at C1.
33. Meller & Deutsch, supra note 32, at C1.
34. Id.
35. Sorkin, supra note 32, at C1.
36. Id. There are fifteen member states in the European Union. PAOLO
MENGOZZI, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW FROM THE TREATY OF ROME TO THE
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proposal.37 G.E. and the E.C. were still negotiating in late June,
2001, with G.E. offering to sell as much as a 19.9 percent 8 stake in
GECAS to a non-competitor through preferred shares. 9 G.E.
wanted to maintain some control over the shares by restricting
their transfer or sale to instances where G.E. granted permission."
Finally, G.E. issued a statement that they were finished
negotiating." The E.C. Commissioner, Mario Monti, 2 indicated
that they were still open to negotiations that would involve "a
structural commitment to modify the commercial behaviour of
GECAS.' 3 Mr. Monti expressed regret that this route had not
been fully pursued and said the merger review would continue
unless it was withdrawn." More comments supporting the merger
were made from the U.S. political arena." Mr. Monti's response
was that politics were irrelevant to the E.C.'s decision and that he
did not understand the political criticism because at the time a
final decision had not been rendered.48
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM 2-4 (Patrick Del Duca trans., KIuwer Law
International 2d ed. 1999). The member states are: France, Germany,
Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland,
Denmark, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Id.
37. Paul Meller, Another Step in Killing Deal for Honeywell, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2001, at C1.
38. See Andrew R. Sorkin & Paul Meller, G.E. Is Said to Float Plan to Save
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2001, at C1 (stating that the E.C. had originally
wanted the twenty percent stake to be sold to the public or a competitor).
39. Paul Meller & Andrew R. Sorkin, Europe Indicates to G.E. New Offer Is
Unacceptable, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001, at C2. The new offer also involved
G.E. having to divest itself of less revenue. Id. In the E.C., such a proposal
would require market testing (getting opinions from competitors). Id. The
E.C. considered this unacceptable because of time constraints. Id.
40. Id. If G.E. were allowed to sell less than twenty percent, then it could
still consolidate GECAS' earnings on its books and not separate them from
their own. Id. The owner of these Class B shares would not have a financial
interest but would have voting rights. Commission Decision, supra note 8, at
para. 551. The owner of the preferred shares would be allowed to elect a
director independent from G.E. Id. at para. 535. This arrangement was
unsatisfactory to the E.C. because G.E. would still ultimately control GECAS
through their ability to select the investor, limit the transferability of the
stock and would not affect G.E.'s behavior. Id. at para. 552.
41. Press Release, European Commission, Statement on General
Electric/Honeywell Merger, IP/01/842 (Jun. 14, 2001) (on file with author).
42. Mr. Monti is a Yale-educated, Italian economist in charge of the E.C.'s
competition agency. Sorkin, supra note 17, at Al.
43. Press release, European Commission, Statement on General
Electric/Honeywell Merger, IP/01/842 (Jun. 14, 2001) (on file with author).
44. Id.
45. Sorkin & Meller, supra note 38, at Cl. The U.S. Treasury Secretary,
Paul O'Neill, attacked the Commission's proposed ruling, stating that it would
be "off the wall" for them to prohibit the merger after the U.S. approved it. Id.
46. Press Release, European Commission, Commissioner Monti Dismisses
Criticism of G.E/Honeywell Merger Review and Rejects Politicization of the
Case, IP/01/855, (June 18, 2001) (on file with author). Mr. Monti stated, "I
deplore attempts to misinform the public and to trigger political intervention.
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Interplay continued between G.E. and Honeywell. Honeywell
offered to accept $1.8 billion less than the agreed purchase price if
G.E. would make the divestitures required by the E.C.
regulators.47 Mr. Welch rejected Honeywell's proposal stating that
the divestures the E.C. required would no longer make the deal
profitable for G.E.'s shareholders.48
In early July 2001, the E.C. decided to block the deal.49 This
marked the first time a deal involving two American companies
had been blocked solely by the E.C.° It was also only the fifteenth
This is entirely out of place in an antitrust case and has no impact on the
Commission whatsoever. This is a matter of law and economics, not politics."
Id.
Mr. Monti further said that "[tihe nationality of the companies and
political considerations have played and will play no role in the examination of
mergers, in this case as in all others." Id.
47. Andrew R. Sorkin, G.E. Reportedly Weighing an End to Honeywell Bid,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2001, at A13. Honeywell distributed this letter to the
press, a move that to many, signaled desperation. Sorkin, supra note 7, at Al.
G.E. responded to Honeywell by sending its own letter through the press
rejecting their proposal and signed the letter, "Best, Jack." Id. G.E. also tried
to persuade Honeywell to let it withdraw its application from the E.C. so that
no vote could occur that might establish that G.E. was dominant in aviation
equipment, possibly making future mergers more complicated. Id. However,
Honeywell was reluctant to allow G.E. to withdraw its bid because in doing so
Honeywell would not be able to sue G.E. for breach of the merger contract
requiring G.E. to extend "best efforts" to finish the deal. Id.
48. Id.
49. Sorkin, supra note 7, at Al. The Commission found that G.E. already
had a dominant position in the large commercial jet engine market and in the
large regional aircraft market. Press Release, European Commission, The
Commission Prohibits GE's Acquisition of Honeywell, IP/01/939 (July 3, 2001)
(on file with author). This was based on G.E.'s strong market position in
aircraft leasing and financial strength. Id. The Commission also found that
Honeywell is the leader in supplying avionics, non-avionics products, engines
for corporate jets, and engine starters. Id. G.E. and Honeywell are the only
companies manufacturing engines for large regional jets; large regional jets
accounted for thirty-three percent of the European fleet in 1998. Commission
Decision, supra note 8, at paras. 20-23. The Commission believed that the
merger would have resulted in "the creation of dominant positions in the
markets for the supply of avionics, non-avionics and corporate jet engines, as
well as to the strengthening of GE's existing dominant positions in jet engines
for large commercial and large regional jets." Press Release, European
Commission, The Commission Prohibits GE's Acquisition of Honeywell,
IP/01/939 (July 3, 2001) (on file with author). The E.C. also stated that
possible bundling of G.E. and Honeywell products was another reason for
objecting to the merger. Commission Decision, supra note 8, at para. 360. The
Commission stated that the proposed merger would have eliminated
competition and have had an adverse effect on product quality, service, and
prices. Press Release, European Commission, The Commission Prohibits GE's
Acquisition of Honeywell, IP/01/939 (July 3, 2001) (on file with author).
50. Sorkin, supra note 7, at Al. After the G.E.-Honeywell merger was
prohibited by the E.C., Mr. Monti commented on the close cooperation that
took place between the E.C. and the U.S. Department of Justice and said, "I
am determined to strengthen our bilateral cooperation in the future to try and
Press Release, European Commission, The
reduce this risk further."
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time since 1990 that the E.C. had blocked any transaction."'
After the rejection, both companies filed a still-pending
appeal with the European Court of Justice (E.C.J.). 2 The appeal is
restricted to procedural issues. 3 It is only the seventh time that
companies have appealed an E.C. decision to reject a merger.r
Companies typically do not appeal E.C. decisions because the
appeals process can take years." Each of the other six companies
that filed appeals lost their appeals. G.E. and Honeywell do not
want the decision reversed so that the merger can proceed; rather,
G.E. wants the decision overturned because it fears a precedent
that they are in a dominant position will make approval for future
acquisitions more difficult to obtain. 7
The G.E.-Honeywell merger is an extreme example of what
can happen during the merger approval process. Before this
comment evaluates the interaction between U.S. and E.U.
antitrust law, it first briefly examines the laws governing each
regulatory body.
B. U.S. Antitrust Laws
U.S. antitrust laws are premised on the notion that
competition is in itself valuable. 8 U.S. antitrust statutes include

Commission Prohibits GE's Acquisition of Honeywell, IP/01/939 (July 3, 2001)
(on file with author).
51. Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 2, at 1. The year 1990 is significant as the
year that the E.C. became a "one-stop shop for mergers and acquisitions
requiring regulatory approval[.]" Press Release, European Commission, The
Commission Prohibits GE's Acquisition of Honeywell, IP/01/939 (July 3, 2001)
(on file with author). The E.C. indicated that they had to prohibit the merger
because G.E. "was unable to propose undertakings that would have removed
all competition concerns" and that the merger "would create or strengthen
dominant positions on several markets and that the remedies proposed by GE
were insufficient to resolve the competition concerns ....
Id. It appears that
European Competition Commissioner Mario Monti believes the companies are
at fault. Id. Mr. Monti is quoted as saying, "I regret that the companies were
not able to agree on a solution that would have met the Commission's
competition concerns." Id.
52. G.E. and Honeywell Appeal Europe's Rejection of Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2001, at C8.
53. Id.
54. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Paul Meller, G.E. Said to Be PlanningAppeal of
Honeywell Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at C4.
55. See id. (stating that after a company submits its appeal, regulators from
the fifteen member-nations submit their opinions, which are then reviewed
and compiled into a final submission by the Commission to the court).
56. Id. In the only two instances since 1990 that the E.C.J. overturned a
decision of the Commission, each occurred when a merger was approved but
the competitors appealed. Id.
57. Id.
58. Georg Terhorst, The Reformation of the E.C. Competition Policy on
Vertical Restraints, 21 J. INT'L L. BUS. 343, 352 (2000).
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the Sherman Act,"6 the Clayton Act,6" and the Federal Trade
Commission Act.6 The Department of Justice (D.O.J.) and the
Federal Trade Commission (F.T.C.), as well as each state through
its attorney general, has authority to review mergers." The D.O.J.
enforces both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, while the
F.T.C. enforces only the Clayton Act. 3 The D.O.J. cannot block a
merger.64 When the D.O.J. doubts the legality of a merger, it
refers the matter to a federal district court for review.6 The F.T.C.
has the authority to block a merger through an administrative law
judge.66 If the F.T.C. blocks a merger, the affected companies can
59. The pertinent parts of the Sherman Act include:
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in Restraint of Trade Illegal; penalty.
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
§ 2 Monopolizing Trade a Felony; penalty.
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony[.]
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000). While the statute purports to prohibit all restraints of
trade, the U.S. Supreme Court has limited the reach of the Sherman Act to
only prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade. See State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citing United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505
(1898)). The courts employ a "rule of reason" analysis requiring the fact finder
to determine if there is an unreasonable restraint on competition. Id. When
applying the "rule of reason" analysis, several factors must be evaluated
including: "specific information about the relevant business, its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's history, nature
and effect." Id. Criminal or civil penalties may be assessed for violations of
the Sherman Act. Joint FTC/DOJ International Antitrust Guidelines, FTC
TODAY, Apr. 1995, at 1. Criminal prosecutions are "limited to traditional per
se offenses of the law, which typically involve price-fixing, customer allocation,
bid rigging or other cartel activities that would also be violations of the law in
many countries." Id.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
62. Eric J. Stock, Explaining the Differing U.S. and EU Positions on the
Boeing/McDonnell-DouglasMerger: Avoiding Another Near-Miss, 20 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 825, 826 (1999). However, because most states do not have the
resources necessary for such antitrust regulation and enforcement, the federal
government is primarily responsible for merger approval in the United States.
Id. at 827.
63. Id. Recently there has been some discussion on changing the way
mergers are evaluated by the F.T.C. and D.O.J. See John R. Wilke & Nicholas
Kulish, Agencies Plan Merger-Oversight Changes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2002,
at A8 (reporting that the D.O.J. and F.T.C. are contemplating changes in the
way mergers are divided between them, stating that the D.O.J. would
exclusively handle the merger approval process for software, games, and
telecommunications and that only the F.T.C. would regulate the mergers in
the health care, energy and electricity industries).
64. Stock, supra note 62, at 827.
65. Id. at 828.
66. Id.
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first appeal to the full commission, followed by further review by a
federal appellate court. 67
The F.T.C. and the D.O.J. have jointly issued Horizontal
Merger Guidelines for companies to use when contemplating
mergers or acquisitions. 6
The factors the agencies consider
include:
[w]hether the merger would
significantly increase
concentration and result in a concentrated market,...
whether the merger ... raises concern about potential
adverse competitive effects[,] ... whether entry would be
timely, likely and sufficient either to deter or to counteract
the competitive effects of concern[ ,]... any efficiency gains
that reasonably cannot be achieved by the parties through
other means[, and] ... whether, but for the merger, either
party to the transaction would be likely to fail, causing its
assets to exit the market.69
Many international companies have to contend not only with
U.S. antitrust laws, but also with the laws of the E.U.
C. European Union Competitive Law
Both the E.U. and the individual member states have
authority to approve mergers," but ultimately only one authority
can challenge the merger.7' The European Commission has the
authority to review the merger when its effects extend to more
67. Id.
68. See Oliveros, supra note 5 (stating that horizontal agreements are
formed between companies on the same level of the production and
distribution processes; vertical agreements are formed between companies on
different levels of the production and distribution processes); 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Sept. 10, 1992).
69. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Sept. 10,
1992). The agencies undertake a separate analysis when determining whether
to bring an antitrust claim against a foreign defendant. Joint FTC/DOJ
International Antitrust Guidelines, FTC TODAY, Apr. 1995, at 28. These
factors may include:
(1) the relative significance to the alleged violation of conduct within the
United States, as compared to conduct abroad; (2) the nationality of the
persons involved in or affected by the conduct; (3) the presence or
absence of a purpose to affect U.S. consumers, markets or exporters; (4)
the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct
on the United States as compared to the effects abroad; (5) the existence
of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated by the
action; (6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign
economic polices; (7) the extent to which the enforcement activities of
another country with respect to the same persons, including remedies
resulting from those activities, may be affected; and (8) the effectiveness
of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. enforcement action.
Id. at 28-29.
70. Stock, supra note 62, at 827.
71. Id.
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than one nation and when there is a "Community Dimension. 72
The European Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction to review
Commission decisions. 7' The Commission must be notified within
one week of either, the conclusion of the agreement, the public
announcement of the bid, or the acquisition of the controlling
interest, whichever comes first.7 4 After the Commission receives
notification, it will publish a "Fact of the Notification" that
includes the parties' names, the nature of the transaction and the
involved economic sectors."5 The Commission then has four weeks
to decide how to proceed." The Commission evaluates whether the
proposed transaction will create or strengthen a dominant position
as a result of which effective competition would be significantly
impeded in the common market, or in a substantial part of it. 77 If
a dominant position is not created or strengthened, the transaction
will be declared compatible with the common market and allowed
to proceed. 8 If a dominant position is created or strengthened, the
transaction will be declared incompatible with the common market
and disallowed. 9
72. Id.; Council Regulation 4064/89, on the Control of Concentrations
between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1 (stating that a community
dimension exists when each company meets a certain dollar amount of sales
worldwide, or where the company has a certain percentage of sales within one
Member state). The threshold amounts were last updated in 1997. Council
Regulation 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 Amending Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89,
on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1.
The new amounts are:
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings
concerned is more than ECU 2,500 million; (b) in each of at least three
Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all the
undertakings concerned is more than ECU (European Currency Units)
100 million; (c) in each of at least three Member States included for the
purpose of point (b), the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 25 million; and (d) the
aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 100 million; unless each of
the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member
State.
Id. G.E. and Honeywell met this requirement; each has sales in excess of 2,500
million ECU. Commission Decision, supra note 8, para. 7. However, neither
had two-thirds of their sales from one Member State. Id.
73. Council Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1.
74. Id. The E.C. can also start a competition investigation after receiving a
complaint from a third party, or one based on its own review. Hans van
Houtte, Introduction to Council Regulation No. 17/62 and Commission
Regulation No. 27/62, Introduction and Bibliography written Nov. 1989, 2
B.D.I.E.L. 179.
75. Council Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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The primary purpose behind E.U. competition law is economic
integration and the creation of a common market." The secondary
purpose is to avoid a "weakening of competition [that] would be
contrary to the goals of the common market."81 Articles 81 and 82
of the Treaty of Rome pertain to competition law in the E.U. and
apply to the entire European Community. 2 Any agreement
violating Articles 81 and 82 is considered void.83 Article 81
prohibits agreements that have anticompetitive effects in the E.U.;
Article 82 allows the Commission to take action against individual
firms that violate Article 81.84
Sometimes after receiving notice of the agreement, the
Commission will determine that Articles 81 and 82 do not apply
and will send a letter alerting the parties that the file was closed
and no further action will be taken.85 In other instances, the
Commission will grant negative clearance. 6 If the Commission
decides to investigate further, the Commission will send the
companies a statement of objections. 7 This extended investigation
may only last three months before the Commission's decision must
be announced.88 Before the Commission makes a final decision, it
must consult an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives
from each Member State.89 The Advisory Committee will vote and
80. Terhorst, supra note 58, at 352.
81. Id. at 353 (quoting Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. v. Commission,
1973 E.C.R. 215, 244). The E.C. has stated that merger regulations are "not
about protecting competitors but about ensuring that markets remain
sufficiently competitive in the long run so that consumers benefit from
sufficient choice, innovation and competitive prices." Press Release, The
Commission Prohibits GE's Acquisition of Honeywell, IP/01/939 (July 3, 2001)
(on file with author).
82. Terhorst, supra note 58, at 378 n.22 (noting that the Treaty of Rome
was amended by the Amsterdam Treaty, effective May 1, 1999). In the
Amsterdam Treaty, articles 85 and 86 were renumbered as Articles 81 and 82.
Id. The text was not altered when they were renumbered. Id. See also
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (L
340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY; EC TREATY art. 82.
83. EC TREATY, supra note 82, art. 81.
84. Oliveros, supra note 5, at 728.
85. Id. at 730. Commission might also request that the agreement be
modified. Id.
86. Id. A negative clearance is defined as a decision of the Commission to
publish a fact summary regarding its findings. Id. Third parties also have the
opportunity to submit their opinions. Id. The parties are essentially asking
the E.C. to confirm that the notified action is not in violation of the antitrust
laws. Houtte, supra note 74. The E.C. could also grant an exemption if it
believes that the agreement will benefit consumers. Id.
87. Oliveros, supra note 5, at 731. This statement of objections will contain
the factual findings of the E.C., any evidence of an infringement of Articles 85
or 86, and an explanation why an exemption will not be granted. Houtte,
supra note 74. The parties under investigation then are given an opportunity
to respond either in writing or at a hearing. Id.
88. Council Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1.
89. Id. at art. 19.
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then deliver its opinion to the Commission, which is obligated to
take "the utmost account of the [Advisory Committee's] opinion. " "
If the Commission finds that Articles 81 or 82 are violated, the
Commission can order that the agreement be terminated. 91 The
Commission can assess a large fine on companies that violate E.U.
competition law.92
The Commission must closely scrutinize
mergers because the remedies available to it after a merger is
approved are much more limited than that of the U.S. agencies. 9'
The European Court of Justice is the final resort for
companies in antitrust cases. Part of the E.C.J.'s responsibilities
include construing the competition provisions of the E.E.C. Treaty.
In Commercial Solvents v. Commission,9 4 the court examined an
alleged dominant position.9" Commercial Solvents Corporation
(CSC), a U.S. corporation, owned fifty-one percent of Instituto
Chemioterapico Italiano (ICI), an Italian company.96
CSC
produced a chemical that it allowed ICI to sell to another
company, Laboratorio Chimico Farmaceutico Giorgio Zoja (Zoja),
that processed the chemical into a final product. 7 CSC decided to
discontinue the resale of the chemical so that ICI could process the
90. Id.
91. Oliveros, supra note 5, at § C8.
92. Id. The fine will be assessed regardless of whether the companies
violated the law negligently or intentionally. Id. The fine can range from any
amount between 1,000 and 1,000,000 euros, or ten percent of the offending
companies' previous year sales. Id. Volkswagen AG was recently fined 102
million euros for its violation of Article 85(1). Commission Decision Relating
to a Proceeding under Article 85 of the EC Treaty, Case No. IV/35.733
Volkswagen, 1998 O.J. (L124) 60. Volkswagen AG and two of its subsidiaries,
Audi AG and Autogerma S.p.A., had entered into agreements that did not
allow for cars to be sold in Italy to residents of other member states, making it
difficult for vehicles sold in Italy to be re-exported to Germany or Austria. Id.
at § 18. The E.C. imposed a fine of fifty million euros on Volkswagen for the
violation of Article 85, imposed an additional thirty-five million ECU fine to
account for the long duration of the violations (in this case over ten years), and
imposed an additional seventeen million ECU fine for the aggravating
circumstances, specifically, that Volkswagen had not terminated the behavior
after notification by the Commission of the infraction but misled the E.C. to
believe that the problem had been corrected. Id at §§ 215-19.
93. See Seiberg, supra note 2, at B1 (reporting that Mr. Monti stated that
having the power to break up companies in violation of antitrust laws would
allow the E.C. to be less strict in reviewing mergers because then it would be
able to restrain deals that become anticompetitive). By way of comparison,
the U.S. agencies have the ability to break up companies in violation of
antitrust law and can require companies to sell entire operating units. Id.
Furthermore, the U.S. takes a shorter-term view regarding the
anticompetitive effects of a merger than does the E.U. Stoll & Goldfein, supra
note 2, at 3.
94. Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 223.
95. Id.
96. Id.at § 37
97. Idat § 1
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final product itself.98 Zoja notified the E.U. which, in turn,
instituted the court action.99 CSC argued that they were not in a
dominant position because there were other possible sources of the
chemical.0 0 The E.C.J. affirmed the Commission's finding that
CSC was in a dominant position because the other sources referred
to by CSC were experimental and were significantly smaller.''
The court also held that CSC abused its dominant position under
Article 86 when it decided to discontinue supplying Zoja with the
chemical and began manufacturing the final product itself.' 2 In
summary, the regulators in the E.U. evaluate mergers using
criteria different than those employed by the U.S. regulators.' 3
However, understanding each individual country's laws is less
significant than understanding the interaction between the
different countries laws through their extraterritorial applications.
II.

INTERACTION BETWEEN U.S. AND EUROPEAN UNION ANTITRUST

LAWS

Part II-A examines U.S. case law concerning the
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws from both a historical
and current perspective. Part II-B then examines E.U. decisions
on the same topic. Part II-C concludes the section by discussing
agreements reached between the U.S. and E.U. on the application
of antitrust/competition laws.
A. U.S. Decisions on ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws
1. A HistoricalSurvey of U.S. Decisions
An early United States Supreme Court case discussing the
applicability of U.S. laws on activities that transpired outside of
the U.S. is American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,"0 4 authored
by Justice Holmes. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant
for antitrust violations that occurred in Costa Rica and Panama.0 0
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The E.C. looks at the effect the merger will have on the overall market
and will reject mergers where a dominant position is created or strengthened.
Stoll & Goldfein supra note 2, at 3. In contrast, the U.S. concentrates on any
possible harm the merger will have on consumers. Id. at 5. Using the G.E.Honeywell merger as an example, the E.C. was able to use GECAS, a unit

relatively unrelated to the merger, to block the merger because of perceived
effects on competition. Id. at 3. The F.T.C. and D.O.J. generally cannot block
a merger unless the competitive effects are directly related to the merging
parties' assets. Id. at 8.
104. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
105. Id. at 353-55.
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Both the plaintiff and defendant were U.S. corporations.""° Justice
Holmes affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that
conspiring in the U.S. to do acts in another country that would be
illegal in the U.S., but that are legal in that other country, was not
a valid cause of action."°7 He reasoned that "the character of an act
as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done.""°8
Several years later, the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit decided another significant case,
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), involving the
application of U.S. laws to acts that took place outside of the
U.S. 9 Alcoa allegedly entered into agreements in violation of U.S.
antitrust laws." ° In an opinion written by Judge Learned Hand,
the court explained that the agreements were illegal, even if made
outside of the U.S., if "they were intended to affect imports and
that did affect them.""'1 The court also discussed the required
burdens of proof. After the government proved the companies
intended to affect imports, the burden of proof then shifted to the
defendant to prove that imports were not affected." 2 Ultimately,
the court determined there was a violation of the law and issued
an injunction." 3
The Ninth Circuit used a different test when it examined a
claim that U.S. and Honduran companies had conspired in
violation of U.S. antitrust laws." 4 The court employed a threeprong test to determine if it should allow the claim to proceed.
The test required: (1) some effect on American foreign commerce;
106. Id. at 354.
107. Id. at 359. Justice Holmes stated that the plaintiffs case rested on
"several rather startling propositions." Id. at 355. He continued, "In the first
place, the acts causing the damage were done, so far as appears, outside the
jurisdiction of the United States, and within that of other states. It is
surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the act of Congress."

Id.
108. Id. at 356. The court stated that applying the U.S. law to actions that
had taken place outside the U.S. would be "unjust," and an "interference with
the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which
the other state concerned justly might resent." Id.
109. 148 F.2d at 416. The case was originally to be heard before the U.S.
Supreme Court but the court did not have the required quorum of six to hear

the case, so therefore the Court referred it to the Court of Appeals. Id. at 421.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 444. Conversely, the court stated that agreements made outside
of the U.S. were not illegal if there was no intent to affect imports but
nonetheless there was an affect on imports or exports. Id. Furthermore, the

court rationalized that an agreement that was intended to have an affect on
imports or exports but did not affect them was not illegal. Id.

112. Id.
113. Id. at 448.
114. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir.

1976).
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(2) that the effect be substantial enough to warrant an American
court's exercise of jurisdiction; and (3) the balancing of the
strength of the American interest, as opposed to the
strength of
1
another country's interest, in asserting jurisdiction. 1
2. Hartford and Its Progeny
The most recent U.S. Supreme Court case addressing the
issue of extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws is
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California."' In Hartford, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant insurers and reinsurers
violated the Sherman Act." 7 The defendants filed motions to
dismiss or alternatively, for summary judgment."' The district
court granted the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals
reversed."'
Some of the defendant reinsurers were London
companies.120 These London reinsurers argued that while the U.S.
court may have jurisdiction over the case, it should refuse to
exercise that jurisdiction because of the interest of another
country, in this case, Great Britain.12' The U.S. Supreme Court
relied on the well-established principle that the Sherman Act
applies when foreign corporations produce a "substantial effect" in
the U.S., stating that international comity would not prevent the
exercise of jurisdiction in this case. 2 The "effects doctrine" allows
a U.S. court to have general jurisdiction "over foreign conduct that
was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial
effect in the United States.1 2 3 The Court then engaged in a
conflict of law analysis, holding that there would only be a conflict
when it was not possible to follow both U.S. and British laws

115. Id. at 614. The court also provided factors to determine whether the

third prong of the test was satisfied. These factors included:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or
allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business
or corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be
expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which

there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the
foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with

conduct abroad.
Id. at 614.
116. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).

117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 778.
Id.
Id.
Id.

121. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 795.

122. Id. at 796-97.
123. See id. at 796. Oliveros, supra note 5 (noting that imports for sale in
the U.S. will meet this "intent test," as will mergers and acquisitions under
the Clayton Act).
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simultaneously.'24 Finding no conflict of law, the Court allowed
the exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign defendants in this
125
case.
The next major federal case addressing the extraterritorial
application of antitrust law was United States v. Nippon Paper
Industries, Co.1 6 Nippon involved the extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust laws in a criminal context. In Nippon, a
Japanese defendant was criminally charged under section 1 of the
Sherman Act with conspiring, in Japan, to fix the prices of
Nippon's fax paper sold in the United States.1 27 The trial court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because the alleged
conspiracy took place entirely in Japan. 12 However, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and reinstated the
indictment.129 The appellate court relied on Hartford, and rejected
the defendant's argument that comity would warrant dismissal of
the case.'
The appellate court reiterated that under Hartford,
comity only applied when the laws of the other country required
the defendant to act in violation of U.S. law or when it was not
possible to comply simultaneously with the laws of both
countries.'
Furthermore, the court found the defendant's alleged
conduct illegal in both the U.S. and Japan, but the U.S. was the
more appropriate forum to prosecute because32 only American
consumers felt the effects of the alleged actions.1

124. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 799. Several commentators have stated that
Hartford was wrongly decided. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Postscript, The
ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws: A Postscript on Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 213, 220 (1993) (stating that
Hartford is a sharp divergence from previous cases, providing little guidance
on how to handle cases where there is a conflict between two countries' laws,
and showing a lack of respect for "the fundamental sovereignty interests of
another country that may have concurrent jurisdiction"); Joseph P. Griffin,
Sovereignty Revisited: Regulation of Competition in the Canada!U.S. Context
ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Antitrust Law - A U.S. Perspective, 22 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 315, 321 (1998) (asserting that Hartford was based on faulty reasoning
and a misunderstanding of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law). But cf.
Varun Gupta, Note, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J.
2287, 2288 (1996) (asserting that Hartford was decided correctly but that the
reasoning was wrong and agreeing that principles of international comity are
no longer appropriate).
125. Hartford,509 U.S. at 799.
126. 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
127. Id. at 2.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id. at 9.
130. Id. at 8.
131. Nippon PaperIndus. Co., 109 F.3d at 8.
132. Id.
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B. E. U. Case Law Addressing the ExtraterritorialApplication of
CompetitionLaws
The European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) has had several
opportunities to consider the application of E.U. competition laws
to activities occurring outside the E.U. In Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v.
Commission,133 the E.C.J. examined whether its laws should apply
to U.S., Canadian, Swedish, and Finnish producers of wood pulp
who allegedly conspired to fix prices of wood pulp in the E.U."'
The E.C.J. held that its laws applied because the agreement was
implemented in the E.U.'3' The place of negotiation and execution
of agreement was deemed irrelevant.'36 The E.C.J. also noted that
Article 85 applied to all agreements affecting trade in the Member
States, and that the wood pulp producers competed for orders in
the European Community.'37
Such competition rendered the
participants subject to E.U. regulation. 3 ' In a conflict analysis
similar to that found in Hartford and Nippon, the E.C.J. observed
that the companies were not subject to conflicting laws of their
home countries and, thus, the E.U. laws would be enforced.'39
Moreover, the Court summarily rejected the defendants' comity
argument and refused to allow the Commission's jurisdiction to be
questioned.14
In Commercial Solvents, the E.C.J. again had the opportunity
to examine the effect needed on the member states in order for the
anticompetitive behavior to be reviewable by the Commission.'
CSC and ICI argued that since Zoja sold ninety percent of its
finished product outside of the E.U., the Commission did not have
jurisdiction to examine CSC's actions. 4 2 Nonetheless, the E.C.J.
held that whether Zoja exported its products or sold them in the
E.U. was immaterial because sales outside the E.U. would have an
effect on the competitive structure within the E.U."4 ' Additionally,
the E.C.J. found that Zoja did sell its product in two member
states.' This case illustrates the very broad interpretation of the
"effects" needed in order for the E.C. to have jurisdiction over an
antitrust issue.
133. Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, Ahlstrom
Osakeyhtio v. Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (commonly referred to as the
"Woodpulp" case).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio, 1988 E.C.R. 5193.
140. Id.
141. Istituto ChemioterapicoItaliano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corp.,

1974 E.C.R. 223.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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The case commonly referred to as Dyestuff considered the
issue of a parent company located outside of the E.U., and its
subsidiary located inside the E.U., engaging in alleged price-fixing
with other companies."' In Dyestuff, ten individual companies
allegedly engaged in a concerted effort to raise prices by the same
percentage within a short period of time.'46 The court said that the
companies' price-fixing activities had an effect on the E.U. market
and, therefore, the companies were subject to fines.'47 The E.C.J.
also ruled that because of the parent company's control over the
subsidiary, it was appropriate to fine the parent company for the
In an effort to reduce some of this
subsidiary's actions."'
extraterritorial application of each country's antitrust law, the
U.S. and the E.U. have entered into bilateral agreements.
C. Agreements Between the U.S. and E. U.RegardingAntitrust Law
In 1991, the U.S. and the E.U. entered into an agreement
concerning the application of antitrust laws. ' The Acting
Attorney General and the Chairman of the F.T.C. signed on behalf
of the U.S. and the Vice President of the E.C. signed on behalf of
the E.U.15° Article I of the 1991 Agreement stated that its purpose
was "to promote cooperation and coordination and lessen the
possibility or impact of difference between the Parties in the
In Article II, the parties
application of their competition laws."''.
agreed to notify each other when one party's antitrust activities
could affect the interests of the other party, and specified events
that could trigger the notification requirement.152 Article III
obligated the parties to hold regular meetings in order to facilitate
an exchange of information regarding their antitrust activities."3
Article IV obligated each party to cooperate and coordinate with
the other's antitrust enforcement activities on specified
Article V formalized positive comity,"' whereas,
occasions." '
145. Case 48/69, Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1972 E.C.R. 619
[hereinafter the "Dyestuffs" case].
146.
147.
148.
149.
1991,
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Agreement on the Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23,
U.S.-E.U., 30 I.L.M. 1487 [hereinafter the "Agreement].
Id.

151. Id. at 1492.
152. Id. at 1493.
153. Id. at 1496.
154. Agreement on the Application of their Competition Laws, Sept. 23,
1991, U.S.-E.U., 30 I.L.M. 1487.
155. Id. at 1497-98. Positive comity allows regulators in one country to ask
the regulators in the other country to investigate possible antitrust violations
in the notified country on behalf of the requesting country. Id. at 1498. The
U.S. and the E.U. entered into a subsequent agreement in 1998 that defined
and expanded the positive comity principles described in the 1991 Agreement.
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Article IV formalized
51 6 negative comity and set forth specific factors
for consideration.
In 1994, France, Spain, and the Netherlands brought suit
before the E.C.J. seeking an annulment of the 1991 Agreement on
the grounds that the Commission did not have authority to enter
into the Agreement and that the Agreement had to be approved by
the Council of Ministers." 7 The E.C.J. agreed and annulled the
Agreement.5 8 After this decision, the European Council approved
the Agreement and re-entered it into force on April 10, 1995 with
the effective date retroactively set to the original date of the 1991
Agreement. 9 An understanding of the suits brought by France,
Spain, and the Netherlands, and the agreements by the
Commission can help bring some predictability to the merger
process until a different process has been adopted.
III. PROPOSAL
There are several different options to consider regarding the
improvement of international antitrust enforcement. The first and
simplest option is to do nothing. Business will continue as always,
with several jurisdictions requiring independent merger approval.
This option does not solve the problem of obtaining merger
approval from several different regulators because businesses will
still be required to comply with multiple antitrust regulations. A
second option would be for the U.S. to continue entering into
bilateral agreements to cooperate with other countries in antitrust
regulation. 6 ° Although this may be a viable short-term goal, it
Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of the
United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in
the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, Apr. 6, 1998, U.S.-E.U., 1998
O.J. (L 173) 1.
156. Agreement on the Application of their Competition Laws, U.S.-E.U.,
Sept. 23, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1487. Negative comity is "to refrain from enforcing
competition laws where such enforcement would unduly interfere with the
legitimate sovereign interests of the other signatory." Charles F. Rule,
Introductory Note to Agreement on the Application of their Competition Laws,
Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-E.U., 30 I.L.M. 1487.
157. Case C-327/91, French Republic v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3641.
158. Id.
159. Decision of the Council and the Commission of 10 April 1995
Concerning the Conclusion of the Agreement between the European
Communities and the Government of the United States of America Regarding
the Application of Their Competition Laws, 1995 O.J. (L 131).
160. The United States has already entered into some bilateral agreements
including treaties with Canada and Australia. Agreement Regarding the
Application of their Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws,
Aug. 3, 1995, U.S.-Can., 35 I.L.M. 309; Agreement Relating to Cooperation on
Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-Austl., 21 I.L.M. 702. See Edward T.
Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 647-

48 (2001) (stating that the U.S. also has agreements with several other
countries including Germany, Brazil, Israel, Japan, and Mexico).
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does not meet the needs of businesses because cooperation is
generally optional under the agreements and the companies would
then have to research and analyze several different agreements to
determine how to proceed. A third option is to establish a global
forum dispute resolution.161 This alternative has already been
achieved on a much smaller scale in the E.U. Several European
countries have combined their rules and regulations. In fact, the
E.U. favors the World Trade Organization
(W.T.O.) having an
1 62
expanded role in competition matters.
Mr. A. Douglas Melamed, Joel Klein's163 replacement as the
D.O.J. lead antitrust prosecutor, has also considered developing a
Global Competition Initiative (G.C.I.). 64 Mr. Melamed proposed
having the G.C.I. become part of a larger world agency, such as
the World Bank.'61
The D.O.J. does not want antitrust
enforcement left to the W.T.O. because it fears that the committee
may not be as committed to the enforcement of antitrust laws as
the U.S. is.'66 However, the United States Trade Representative
(U.S.T.R.) office has suggested that the W.T.O. have a large role in
international antitrust matters.'67 The U.S.T.R. advocates this
measure as part of resolving trade disputes in general. 68 These
observations also show the power struggle between the D.O.J. and
the U.S.T.R. If antitrust regulation were given to the W.T.O., then
the U.S.T.R. would69 suddenly have more power than the D.O.J. in
antitrust matters.
A yet unexplored option is to bypass the W.T.O. or World
161. Contra Griffin, supra note 124, at 322-23 (stating that the U.S. would
not likely agree to any diminution of sovereignty because of the fear that any

new antitrust organization would not have strong antitrust laws since half of
the countries in the W.T.O. do not have antitrust rules, so negotiating with
those countries would yield a "lowest common denominator").
162. Spencer W. Waller, The Decline of the Nation State and its Effect on

Constitutional and International Economic Law: Contribution:National Laws
and International Markets: Strategies of Cooperation and Harmonization in
the Enforcement of Competition Law, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 1111, 1123 (1996).

163. Mr. Klein had discounted the global forum initiative and instead opted
for positive comity. E. U. / U.S.: Top U.S. Trust-Buster Against WTO Delving in
Competition, EUROPEAN REPORT, Oct. 31, 1998 at 2355. Mr. Klein also said

that the W.T.O. would be an unsuitable forum as many W.T.O. member
nations did not have antitrust/competition codes. Id.
164. Seiberg, supra note 2, at B1. Mr. Melamed also mentioned that on
cases where multiples countries have jurisdiction that the D.O.J. would
consider deferring to foreign antitrust regulators on some cases. Id. This
deference has never before been considered but would be possible if a G.C.I.
built trust and cooperation among antitrust regulators. Id.
165. Id. Mr. Melamed said he preferred the World Bank as opposed to the
W.T.O. because he believed the W.T.O. to be too inflexible for the rapidlychanging business world. Id.
166. Waller, supra note 162, at 1123.
167. Id. at 1122.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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Bank as global forums, and create a new global governing body to
enforce international competition laws.'7 ° This new forum could
then be modeled to avoid the drawbacks associated with the
existing forums.
Initially, this new global forum would not include every
country, but only those countries that account for a substantial
amount of international trade. The countries that are not initially
invited to join this global forum could petition for inclusion if their
trade circumstances change. The reduced number of countries
involved would make it easier for agreements to be reached
regarding what the laws should be and how they should be
implemented.
By far the most difficult obstacle to overcome is deciding what
laws should be adopted and how they should be enforced in each
country. This drawback would have to be overcome by cooperation
among the countries involved based on the recognition of the
importance of this new global forum. Furthermore, each country
would have to take an oath to affirmatively enforce the antitrust
laws in their country, and obligate themselves to use the global
forum as their sole means of international antitrust regulation. If
a country were to join the forum and still permit their individual
antitrust regulators to enforce that country's laws, it would create
another layer of approval, rather than simplifying the procedure.
Another challenge the proposed forum may encounter would
be its organization and structure. One manner of resolution is
that each country represented be allowed to have one vote on
important matters. This one-vote per country requirement would
allow voting parity among all countries so that a country with a
large population would not be able to dominate smaller countries,
which could happen if the number of votes allocated to each
country was based on population. Another alternative is to have
the votes weighted based on the percentage of trade for which each
country accounts. This would alleviate any concerns that a
country may have about giving up too much power. The countries
should be able to have a fixed number of representatives in
attendance for the presentation of information, allowing several
experts to voice their opinions before a final vote. A simple
majority of votes would be needed before any individual antitrust
170. But cf. Luz, supra note 3, at 155; Brian Peck, Comments,
ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws and the U.S.-EU Dispute Over
the Boeing and McDonnel Douglas Merger: From Comity to Conflict? An
Argument for a Binding International Agreement on Antitrust Enforcement
and Dispute Resolution, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163, 1210 (1998) (proposing
that the W.T.O. be the forum used for a global antitrust organization); Thomas
P. O'Toole, Comment, "The Long Arm of the Law" - European Merger
Regulation and Its Application to the Merger of Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas, 11 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 203 (1998)(advocating that the W.T.O. be the
forum chosen for dispute resolution).

The John Marshall Law Review

[36:271

actions would take place. To amend the governing laws or make
other substantial changes to the forum, a super-majority of the
votes should be required.
The issue of confidentiality of the information submitted by
the companies to the global forum is certain to be at the forefront
of the debate. The new forum would have to ensure that the
documents submitted be kept in the utmost confidence. The forum
would have to keep the documents sealed in order to protect the
documents from being used by the companies' competitors,
opponents in litigation, or the general public.
These ideas and comments by antitrust regulators are
definitely a step in the right direction because they recognize the
problems that businesses face in today's global markets. More
needs to be done to make this proposal a reality. 7' The new forum
suggested by the regulators would make it simpler and less costly
for businesses to consummate mergers of an international scale. A
good initial step would be for the antitrust regulators to convene
meetings to discuss their involvement in this new proposed global
forum.
IV. CONCLUSION

In summary, the failed G.E.-Honeywell merger is an example
of the effects that conflicting international antitrust regulations
can have on important mergers. The merger was approved in the
U.S.; however, the E.C. rejected the merger even though G.E.
made several concessions during their lengthy negotiations. 172 The
E.C. rejected the merger because of a possible strengthening of a
dominant position in the market. 173 The U.S. and E.U. antitrust
regulators used different methods in evaluating the merger. 7 1 The7
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act govern U.S. antitrust law. 1
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome govern E.U. competition
law. 176 Additional problems arise when the U.S. and E.U. courts
try to apply their laws extraterritorially. Therefore, the creation
of an independent global forum used to resolve all international
antitrust issues would be a logical and pragmatic solution to the
current paradigm.

171. One lawyer suggested that the U.S. should start deferring to decisions
made by other countries as a sign of commitment to the G.C.I. Seiberg, supra
note 2, at B1.
172. See supra Part I.A. (these concessions included not bundling products,
divesting GE revenues and operating GECAS as a semi-independent entity).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing United States

antitrust statutes).
176. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing Articles 81
and 82 of the Treaty of Rome).

